12. Things that happen by chance are those whose cause is undefined and which do not occur for a purpose and not always, or not usually, in some ordained way. All this is clear from the definition of *chance*. 13. [Things that happen] by nature are those whose cause
1369b is in themselves and ordained; for the result is always or for the most part similar. As for things that happen contrary to nature,[189] there is no need to seek exactness as to whether they occur by a natural principle or some other cause [that is not understood]; chance would also seem to be the cause of such things. 14. By compulsion [occur things] that come into being through the actions of the doers themselves [but] contrary to their desire and reasonings. 15. By habit [occurs] what they do because of having often done it. 16. Through reasoning [occur] things that seem to be advantageous on the basis of goods that have been mentioned or as an "end" or as means to an "end", whenever they are done for the sake of the advantage; for the intemperate also do advantageous things, but because of pleasure, not for the advantage. 17. Through anger and desire [come] things that are vengeful. But revenge and punishment differ; for punishment is for the sake of the sufferer,[190] revenge for the sake of the doer, that he may get a sense of fulfillment. What anger is will become clear in the discussion of the emotions,[191] 18. and through longing is done whatever seems pleasurable. The familiar and the habitual are among the pleasurable; for people even do with pleasure many things that are not pleasurable when they have grown accustomed to them. In short, all things that people do of their own volition are either goods or apparent goods or pleasures or apparent pleasures. But since they do willingly whatever they do on their own initiative and not willingly whatever is not at their own initiative, everything that they do willingly would be goods or apparent goods or pleasures or apparent pleasures. (I place removal of evils or apparent evils or exchange of greater for less [evil] among the goods; for they are somehow preferable, and [so is] removal of pains or what appears so; and exchange of lesser for greater similarly among pleasures.) 19. Things that are advantageous and pleasurable, their number and nature, should therefore be understood. Since the subject of the advantageous in deliberative oratory has been discussed earlier,[192] let us now speak about the

189. E.g., the birth of a deformed offspring of healthy parents.
190. To correct the fault, a view also of Plato; see *Gorgias* 507–508.
191. See 2.2; probably a later addition.
192. In 1.6.

pleasurable. Definitions should be thought sufficient if they are neither unclear nor inexact on each subject.

Chapter 11: Topics About Pleasure for Use in Judicial Rhetoric

■ In this chapter Aristotle adopts the definition of pleasure as *kinēsin tina tēs psykhēs*, "a certain movement of the soul." The subject had been much discussed in Plato's Academy during Aristotle's residence there between 367 and 347 B.C.E., and this definition can be attributed to Speusippus, who was probably in charge during Plato's absences and who eventually became Plato's successor (see Fortenbaugh 1970, para. 4; Guthrie 1978, 5:468–469). Later, in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.4.2, Aristotle denies that pleasure is to be viewed as *kinēsis*. Rist (1989:84) regards the statement here as evidence that this section of the *Rhetoric* is one of the earliest parts of the work, written many years before the development of Aristotle's final views of pleasure and the soul. The word traditionally translated "soul" (*psykhē*) literally means "breath." Aristotle, as always, uses it for the vital principle of life found in all living things. In the case of human beings it can often be best translated "mind." To him the word had a scientific, not a religious, connotation. As in some earlier chapters, Aristotle here provides basic knowledge and understanding of human psychology that he regards as needed by a speaker, in this case a speaker in a court of law, but without attempting to show how the topics might be applied in a speech.

1. Let us assume that pleasure [*hēdonē*] is a certain movement [*kinēsis*] of the mind [*psykhē*] and a collective organization of sensual perception reaching into [an individual's] fundamental nature and that pain is the opposite.[193] 2. If pleasure is something of this sort, it is clear that what is productive of the condition mentioned is also 1370a
pleasurable [*hēdu*] and that what is destructive [of it] or is productive of the opposite organization is painful. 3. Movement into a natural state is thus necessarily pleasurable for the most part, and especially whenever a natural process has recovered its own natural state. And habits [are pleasurable]; for the habitual has already become, as it were, natural; for habit is something like nature. (What happens often is close to what happens always, and nature is a matter of "always," habit of "often.") 4. What is not compulsory also [is pleasurable]; for

193. Pain, too, might be called a movement of the soul, but instead of collecting and organizing perceptions, thus inducing a feeling of well-being, it disrupts and distracts or focuses all sensation on what is alien to the natural state of the organism.

compulsion is contrary to nature. Thus, constraints are painful, and it has been rightly said, "Every necessary thing is naturally troublesome."[194] Duties and studies and exertions are painful; for these too are necessarily compulsions unless they become habitual; then habit makes them pleasurable. And their opposites are pleasurable; thus, ease and freedom from toil and carefreeness and games and recreations and sleep belong among pleasures; for none of these is a matter of necessity. 5. And everything is pleasurable for which there is longing; for longing is a desire for pleasure. (Some longings are irrational, some in accordance with reason. I call *irrational* those in which people do not long for something on the basis of some opinion in the mind. Those that are said to be natural are of that sort, like those supplied from the body; for example, thirst and hunger for nourishment and longing for a particular kind of food and longing concerned with taste and sex and in general things that can be touched and things concerned with smell and hearing and sight. [I call things] *in accordance with reason* what people long for on the basis of persuasion; for they desire to see and possess many things after hearing about them and being persuaded [that they are pleasurable].)[195]

6. Since to be pleased consists in perceiving a certain emotion, and since imagination [*phantasia*][196] is a kind of weak perception, and since some kind of imagination of what a person remembers or hopes is likely to remain in his memory and hopes—if this is the case, it is clear that pleasures come simultaneously to those who are remembering and hoping, since there is perception there, too. 7. Thus, necessarily all pleasurable things are either present in perception or past in remembering or future in hoping; for people perceive the present,
1370b remember the past, and hope for the future.

8. Memories are thus pleasurable, not only about things that were pleasant when they were going on but even about some unpleasant things if their consequences are honorable and good. Thus, too, it has been said,

> But sweet it is to remember toils when saved[197]

and

194. Quoted also in *Eudemian Ethics* 2.7.4, where it is attributed to the fifth-century B.C.E. elegiac poet Evenus of Paros.

195. The parenthetical passage was double-bracketed by Kassel (1976) as a later addition by Aristotle.

196. For Aristotle's theory of the imagination, see *On the Soul* 3.3.11.

197. From Euripides' lost *Andromeda*, frag. 131.

> For when he remembers later, a man rejoices at his pains,
> He who suffers much and does much.[198]

The cause of this is that not having an evil is also pleasurable. 9. And things hoped for [are pleasurable] that, when present, seem to confer great delights or benefits and to benefit without giving pain. Generally, things that give delight when present [are pleasurable], both when we hope for them and (for the most part) when we remember them. Thus, even anger is pleasurable as Homer also [said in the verse he] composed about anger,

> Which is much sweeter than honey dripping from the comb;[199]

for no one feels anger at someone who apparently cannot get revenge, and people are not angry—or are less angry—at those much above them in power.

10. A kind of pleasure also follows most desires; for people enjoy a certain pleasure as they remember how they got something or as they hope they will get it; for example, those afflicted with thirst in a fever take pleasure both in remembering how they drank and in hoping to drink, 11. and those in love enjoy talking and writing and continually doing something concerned with the beloved; for in all such things they think, as it were, to have sense perception of the beloved. The starting point of love is the same to all; [it occurs] when [people] not only delight in the beloved's presence but delight in remembering one absent; and they are in love also when there is grief at absence.[200] 12. And similarly, a certain pleasure is felt in mourning and lamentation; for the grief applies to what is not there, but pleasure to remembering and, in a way, seeing him and what he used to do and what he was like. Thus, too, it has been reasonably said,

> Thus he spoke, and raised in them all the sweet longing of tears.[201]

13. And to be revenged is pleasurable; for if not attaining something is grievous, getting it is pleasurable, and angry people who do not get revenge are exceedingly pained, but while hoping for it, they rejoice. 14. And winning is pleasurable not only to those fond of it but to all; for there is an imagining of superiority for which all have desire either

198. An approximate quotation (doubtless from memory) of *Odyssey* 15.400–401.

199. *Iliad* 18.109.

200. The Greek text of this sentence is corrupt and variously reconstructed; see Grimaldi 1980, 1:255.

201. *Iliad* 23.108, of Patroclus, and *Odyssey* 4.183, of Odysseus.

mildly or strongly. 15. Since winning is pleasurable, necessarily, games
1371a of physical combat and mental wit are pleasurable (winning often takes place in these) and games of knucklebone and dice and backgammon. And similarly in the case of serious sports; for pleasure results if one is practiced [in them], and some are pleasurable from the start, such as tracking with dogs and all hunting; for where there is a contest, there is victory. That is also the source of pleasure in lawsuits and contentious debates to those who are practiced and adept.

16. And honor and reputation are among the pleasantest things, through each person's imagining that he has the qualities of an important person; and all the more [so] when others say so who, he thinks, tell the truth. Such ones are neighbors (rather than those living at a distance) and his intimates and fellow citizens (rather than those from afar) and contemporaries (rather than posterity) and the practical (rather than the foolish) and many (rather than few); for those named are more likely to tell the truth than their opposites, [who are disregarded,] since no one pays attention to honor or reputation accorded by those he much looks down on, such as babies or small animals,[202] at least not for the sake of reputation; and if he does, it is for some other reason.

17. A friend is also one of the pleasures; for to be fond of something is pleasurable (no one is fond of wine unless he takes pleasure in wine), and to be liked is pleasurable. There, too, the good is present to someone in his imagination, which all who perceive desire. To be liked is to be cherished for one's own sake. 18. And to be admired is pleasurable because it is the same as being honored. And to be flattered and have a flatterer is pleasurable; for a flatterer is an apparent admirer and apparent friend. 19. To do the same things often is pleasurable; for it was noted above that the habitual is pleasurable. 20. And [conversely] change is pleasurable; for change is a return to nature, because doing the same thing all the time creates an excess of the natural condition.[203] This is the origin of the saying "Change in all things is sweet."[204] For this reason things seen only at intervals are also pleasurable, both human beings and objects; for there is a change

202. *Thērion* is usually a wild animal; thus Grimaldi 1980, 1:258 thought the reference was to barbarians. But it is a diminutive of *thēr*, "beast," and can be a tame animal; in 2.6.23, where it is also coupled with "babies" (*paidia*), the reference seems to be to small creatures that cannot speak or judge an action as shameful.

203. E.g., to learn is pleasant, and thus studying is pleasant, but without an occasional respite from the routine the pleasure is diminished.

204. Euripides, *Orestes* 234.

from what is present, and at the same time what comes at intervals is rare. 21. And to learn and to admire are usually pleasurable; for in admiration there is desire,[205] so the admirable is desirable, and in learning there is the achievement of what is in accordance with nature. 22. And to benefit [others] and to be well treated are among 1371b
pleasurable things; for to be well treated is to attain what people desire, and to confer benefits is to have [the resources to do so] and to surpass [others], both of which people want. Since conferring benefits is pleasurable, it is also pleasant for people to set their neighbors right and to supply their wants.[206] 23. Since to learn and to admire is pleasurable, other things also are necessarily pleasurable, such as, for example, a work of imitation, as in painting and sculpture and poetry, and anything that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not in itself pleasant;[207] for the pleasure [of art] does not consist in the object portrayed; rather there is a [pleasurable] reasoning [in the mind of the spectator] that "this" is "that," so one learns what is involved [in artistic representation].[208] 24. And peripeteias[209] and narrow escapes from dangers [are pleasurable]; for all of these cause admiration. 25. And since what accords with nature is pleasurable and related things are related in accordance with nature, all things that are related and similar are, for the most part, a source of pleasure; for example, human being to human being, horse to horse, and youth to youth. This is the source of the proverbs "Coeval delights coeval,"[210] "Always like together," "Beast knows beast," "Jackdaw by jackdaw,"[211] and other such things. 26. But since all likeness and relationship is pleasurable to an individual, necessarily all are more or less lovers of themselves; for all such things apply most to oneself. And since all are lovers of themselves, necessarily their own things are also pleasurable to all, for example, their deeds and words. Thus, people are for the most part fond of flatterers, lovers, honors, and children;

205. "Desire *to learn*" in the Greek text, but perhaps a misunderstanding by a scribe; see Grimaldi 1980, 1:261–262.

206. Section 22 has been questioned by some editors as interrupting the train of thought. Kassel (1976) double-bracketed it as a later addition by Aristotle.

207. Such as fearful animals or dead bodies; cf. *Poetics* 4.4.1448b10–12.

208. Cf. *Poetics* 4.4.1448b15–17. As seen throughout the *Poetics*, Aristotle's aesthetics are cognitive. The spectator comes to understand cause and effect and the relation of universals to particulars.

209. Sudden changes, as from good fortune to disaster or the reverse. Aristotle seems to be thinking primarily of the pleasure of a spectator.

210. I.e., people take pleasure in those of their own age.

211. "Birds of a feather flock together."

for children are their own doing. And to supply things that are lacking is pleasurable; for it becomes their own doing. 27. Further, since people are, for the most part, given to rivalry, it necessarily follows that it is pleasurable to criticize one's neighbors; and to be the leader. (And since to be the leader is pleasantest, to seem to be wise is also pleasurable; for to be wise in a practical way is a quality of leadership, and wisdom is a knowledge of many and admirable things.)[212] 28. And to spend time at what one thinks he is best at [is pleasurable], as the poet also says:

> Each one presses on to this,
> Allotting the most part of the day
> To what happens to be his best endeavor.[213]

29. And similarly, since games are among pleasurable things, all relaxation is, too; and since laughter is among pleasurable things, necessarily laughable things (human beings and words and deeds) are
1372a also pleasurable. The laughable has been defined elsewhere in the books *On Poetics*.[214] Let this much, then, be said about pleasurable things; and painful things are clear from their opposites.

Chapter 12: Topics in Judicial Rhetoric About Wrongdoers and Those Wronged

■ In the following discussion Aristotle provides, without specifically noting it, many premises for argument from probability resembling techniques taught in the rhetorical handbooks of his time.

1. The reasons why people do wrong are those [just described]. Let us now discuss their dispositions of mind and whom they wrong. Now, then, [people do wrong] whenever they think that something [wrong] can be done and that it is possible for themselves to do it—if, having done it, they [think they] will not be detected or if detected they will not be punished or will be punished but [that] the penalty will be less

212. In the manuscripts, this sentence is found at the beginning of sec. 27, and one good manuscript (F) omits "and to be leader." Kassel (1976) regarded the parenthesis as a late addition by Aristotle. Possibly it was inserted in the wrong place.

213. From Euripides' lost *Antiope*, frag. 183.

214. Presumably in the lost second book, though there is a short definition in *Poetics* 5.1449a32–34: "some kind of mistake and ugliness that is not painful or destructive." The cross-reference is a late addition by Aristotle.

than the profit to themselves or to those for whom they care. What sort of things seem possible or impossible will be discussed later (these are common to all speeches);[215] 2. but those most think they can do wrong without penalty who are skilled at speaking and disposed to action and experienced in many disputes and if they have many friends and if they are rich. 3. They most think they can get away with it if they themselves are among those enumerated; but if [they are] not, [they think so] if they have friends like that or helpers or accomplices; for through these means they are able to act and escape detection and not be punished. 4. [They] also [think so] if they are friends of those being wronged or of the judges; for friends are not on guard against being wronged and seek reconciliation before undertaking legal procedures, while the judges favor their friends and either completely acquit them or assign a small punishment.[216]

5. [Wrongdoers] are likely to be unsuspected if [their appearance and condition in life is] inconsistent with the charges; for example, a weak man [is not likely to be suspected] on a charge of assault, and a poor man and an ugly man on a charge of adultery; and [people are able to get away with] things that are done in the open and in the public eye (no precaution being taken because no one would ever have thought of it) and things so great and of such a sort that no one person [would be thought able to do it]; 6. for these things also are not guarded against: everybody is on guard against usual diseases and wrongs but nobody takes precautions about an affliction that no one has yet suffered. 7. And [people do wrong] who have either no enemy or many enemies; the former think that they will escape because no precautions are being taken against them, the latter do escape because it does not seem likely they would attack those on their guard and [so] they have the defense that they would not have tried. 8. And those [do wrong] who have a means of concealment, either by artifices or hiding places, or abundant opportunities for disposal [of stolen property]. For those who do not escape detection there is [the possibility] of quashing the indictment or postponing the trial or corrupting the judges. And if a penalty is imposed, there is avoidance of full payment or postponement of it for a while, or through lack of means a person will have nothing to pay. 9. Then there are those for whom the profits

215. See 2.19.1–15.

216. This, and the possibility of bribing the judges mentioned later, was made difficult in the Athenian courts by the very large number of juror-judges, a minimum of 201 and often many more.